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INDEMNIFICATION AND MCOs

PHYSICIANS SEEKING INDEMNIFICATION FROM

MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS:
TRANSFORMING EQUITIES AND REMEDIES
Lois Wolf Schwartz*and Jeffrey Cambra**
with Lawrence I. Schwartz, MD.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article explores new legal relationships between physicians and managed care
organizations (MCOs) and the impact of these changes on allocation of liability in
malpractice actions. The physician and the MCO are increasingly at odds in
determining the type and extent of medical services patient subscribers may receive.
Traditionally, the physician bore most, if not all, of the responsibility for such
decisions when they resulted in malpractice actions; MCOs were thought to be
immune since as corporations they were not practitioners of medicine. As liability
theories have adjusted and responded to structural changes in health care delivery
systems, physicians are still on the front line in malpractice awards. However, recent
statutory and case law clearly establishes that MCOs can no longer evade liability
entirely. As the equities change, physicians have new opportunities to obtain
indemnification if necessary. Physicians seeking such relief from MCOs need to adapt
for their own purposes much of the legal theory generally associated with plaintiff
claims.
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H.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN MANAGED CARE AND PHYSICIANS
A. The Emergence of Managed Health Care

Approximately fifty-six million Americans rely on managed care organizations
(MCOs) for their health care. Health maintenance organizations (HMOs), the most
common type of MCO, are said to be enrolling 14,000 Americans per day.1 Managed
care organizations have existed in the United States since the 1930s, but they burst
into dramatic growth in the 1970s in response to the passage of the federal Health
Maintenance Organization Act of 1973,2 which provided for government funding,
development, and regulation of HMOs certified under the Act. This statute supplied
managed care organizations with two essential missing elements: credibility and
financial support. At the same time, traditional health care insurance costs began to
skyrocket. Managed care organizations, which are intended to organize and manage
physicians, hospitals, and health care services in a cost-effective manner and are thus
able to provide comparatively low-cost medical services to a broad base of patient
subscribers, have been credited with taming inflation in the expensive American health
3
care system.
Managed health care is usually provided by a health maintenance organization.
An HMO is defined as a "legal entity through which physicians and other health care
professionals agree to deliver comprehensive health care services to a defined
voluntarily enrolled membership for a fixed fee paid in advance of the [date] such
services [are rendered]." 4 This arrangement is distinguished from the traditional feefor-service model, in which patients or health care insurance providers pay the health
care provider directly for services received based on each specific service rendered.
As a rule, managed care organizations such as HMOs use four general models to
structure their organizations: staff, group, network, or individual practice association
1

Steve Sakson, HAO Backlash Brings Waves ofLegislation, CONTRA COSTA Tvfs, March 16, 1996, at IC.
It should be noted that for purposes of this article, the terms HMO (health maintenance organization) and MCO
(managed care organization) are often used interchangeably. In fact, an HMO is only one type of MCO.

2

42 U.S.C.A. § 300c (West. 1991 & Supp. 1996)

3

For a clear history of the development of MCOs, see Diana Joseph Bearden and Bryan J. Maedgen, Emerging
Theories ofLiabiliO, in the Alanaged Health Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 285 (1995).

4

Steven R. Buchholz, Health A'aintenance Organization'sGatekeeper: Opening the Gate to Liabilit , Through
the OstensibleAgency Theor, ,. 21 W. STATE U. L. REV. 241, 242 (1993), citing Earline P. Weiner, Managed
Health Care: I8,O CorporateLiabilit,.Independent Contractors,and the OstensibleAgency Doctrine, 15
J. CoRP. L.535 (1990).
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(IPA). Some MCOs combine these arrangements.' In the staff model, the MCO
directly employs physicians and other providers to work in a facility owned by the
MCO. The network model allows the MCO to contract with more than one physician
group for services. In the IPA model, the MCO contracts to deliver care in the
physician's office for prenegotiated fees.6
In the group model, a health care plan contracts with a physician group or a
number of groups.' The physicians pool their income and share common facilities,
support staff, and medical records. They often use facilities owned or operated by the
MCO. The physicians are independent contractors of the MCO, but the MCO still
pays the physicians' group a set fee for services rendered to subscribers.' The group
pays its members on a fee-for-service basis, a capitated basis (that is, a fixed dollar
amount per patient per month, regardless of services provided, if any), or some
combination of the two. The group is expected to provide exclusive or near-exclusive
services to the MCO. 9
The traditional theories under which patients directly sued physicians for
malpractice must now be modified to account for numerous players in the field: the
MCO, the physician group, the individual physicians, and the patient herself. For
example, Kaiser physicians are all employees of the Permanente Medical Group and
a vast number are even shareholders. The Permanente Medical Group provides
services only to Kaiser and Kaiser generally receives medical services only from the
Permanente Medical Group. Thus, the physicians are in a formal employment
relationship with the provider group and the provider group is in a formal contractual
relationship with the MCO. This ambiguity has serious ramifications when plaintiffs
attempt to identify co-defendants, when courts attempt to allocate liability, and when
claims, defenses and cross-claims are predicated on theories of vicarious liability.
As this article indicates, courts have elected to define the legal relationship
between the physicians and the MCO functionally rather than formally. Group-plan
physicians who act in a manner that is generally characteristic of employees, including
modification of their services to comply with MCO policies, may be perceived as
agents rather than independent contractors. In addition, the role of the group

5

Jan Lewis, HM'O Liabilityfor Negligent PatientCare, 26 TRIAL 73,73 (September 1990).

6

Id.

7

Groups are often multi-specialty in character. They may also include professionals other than physicians, such
as dentists, osteopaths, or other health care providers. For purposes of consistency, the authors refer to physician
groups rather than provider groups.

8

Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 3, at 6.

9

Id.

JOHN F. KENNEDY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
providing the physicians is a new factor. For example, the MCO likely pays fixed fees
to the group rather than the physicians. The group thus has an incentive to encourage
its member physicians to provide health care in a cost-conscious fashion, with the
result that the group's profits are enhanced. If this practice causes harm to the patient,
it may be appropriate to name the group as a co-defendant.
Finally, the relationship between physicians and subscriber patients must be
reconsidered. If the patient "looks to the institution" for care and has limited choice
in the selection of an individual physician, if the patient perceives that the physician
is an employee of the MCO, or if the MCO "holds out" in its marketing literature or
other materials that the physician is its employee, courts are increasingly willing to
allow claims based on the theory of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel."0
If an MCO uses a true staff model, it can be held vicariously liable as an employer
for malpractice committed by its employee physicians (and other practitioners). On
the other hand, if the MCO adopts the group, network, or IPA model, it has greater
opportunity to insulate itself from liability for malpractice; the MCO can claim that the
physician acted as an independent contractor and thus assumes full responsibility for
her own actions. The courts have been willing to look beyond this legal camouflage,
however, and to impute agency in situations where it is technically nonexistent. The
California Legislature has also stepped in to address this situation." As will be
discussed below, lawmakers are increasingly willing to allocate direct liability to
MCOs in situations where cost-containment or other nonmedical factors affect the
standard of care.
B. The New Relationship between Physician and Managed Care
Organizations
In the past, physicians enjoyed great autonomy in practicing medicine. Most
They could depend on unquestioning
practitioners were self-employed.
reimbursement from the patient's health care insurer (which could be either private or
government) for services provided. In a June 15, 1987 article in the Chicago Tribune
entitled System PutsDoctors, Cost Cutters at Odds, journalist Michael L. Millenson
10

See William A. Chittenden III, MalpracticeLiability andManaged Health Care: History and Prognosis,
26 TORT & INSURANE L.J. 451,459-464 (1991). This article contains an excellent survey of theories of liability
against MCOs.

11

California Health and Safety Code § 1371.25 (West Supp. 1996) states that hold-harmless clauses are now
unenforceable in this state. This means that health plans cannot shift their liability to physicians by including
hold-harmless clauses in their employment contracts. All contracting parties are responsible for their own acts
or omissions. Thus, an l-IMO can no longer evade liability under a hold-harmless clause and can be implicated
under "doctrines of equitable indemnity, comparative negligence, contribution, or other statutory or common
law bases for liability." See MedicallnsuranceExchange of California[MIEC] Claims Alert, April 1996, at
2.
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states: "The practicing physician could count on an extraordinary degree of freedom
to practice medicine however he [sic] wished and to bill whatever he chose."'" The
largely unmonitored fee-for-service arrangement was perceived to encourage
overutilization. 3 Overutilization might include extra appointments, unnecessary
procedures, expensive treatments, and overlong hospital stays. This in turn resulted
in increasing costs of health coverage. Employers providing employee benefit
packages that included health care and individuals who were required to obtain their
own health insurance complained that the expenses were out of control. Even an
article in the conservative Journal of the American Medical Association in 1990
acknowledged the skyrocketing cost of medical care. 4
As managed care organizations such as HMOs grew in popularity, they presented
an attractive alternative to both subscribers and physicians. Subscribers benefitted
financially from the fact that the managed care organization held costs down by
monitoring utilization of medical resources. 5 Under the staff model, physicians were
attracted by promises of shorter hours, a guaranteed income, and relief from the
business concerns of starting or running a medical practice. 6 In exchange for these
benefits, the physician working with an MCO must accept the MCO's heightened
oversight and restrictions: "[f]or example, physicians might be barred from using an
institution's facilities for a disapproved medical procedure, or payment might be
conditioned on compliance with treatment protocols. Other rules might include
policies and procedures governing referrals, payments, submission of claims, and
resolution of grievances." 7

12

Cited in Helene L. Parise, comment, The ProperExtension of Tort LiabilityPrinciplesin the ManagedCare
hIdustry, 64 TEMPLE L. REV. 977,985 (1991).

13

Id. at984.

14

Id. at 977, citing David M. Eddy, What Do We Do About Costs?, 264 JAMA 1161, 1161 (1990).

15

This has been characterized alternatively in the literature as regulation of services or rationing of services,
depending on one's point of view. See Parise, supra note 12, at 980.

16

Alternatively, under the group or IPA model, physicians were attracted by the potentially steady flow of patients
and the resulting income. IPA physicians generally continue to run their own offices and to treat patients outside
the subscriber pool of the MCO with which they are affiliated.

17

Parise, supra note 12, at 986-987.
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C. Cost Containment as a Means of MCO Control over Physicians
The MCO exercises a good deal of direct and indirect control over medical
services by setting policies for health care delivery that emphasize cost containment.
There are two broad categories of such cost-containment measures:
First, administrative factors are designed to contain costs, including benefit
package design, underwriting, eligibility determination, provider selection,
health care delivery methods, and controls on quality of care. Second, direct
cost-containment measures are employed, such as reducing frequency of
medical services and claims, reducing expenditures for services rendered, and
changing the point of service to less expensive locations or procedures. 8
The physician is necessarily influenced by the MCO's policies in providing services
to patients. This affects the functional and legal relationship between physician and
MCO:
Cost-containment measures can and do create conflicts between doctors and
patients .... Treating physicians working with managed care organizations are
almost always placed in the middle of this conflict. On the one hand, they are
obligated to provide acceptable medical care to patients. On the other hand,
if they do too many tests, spend too much money, or order too long a
hospitalization, they may not get paid as much by the HMO... In some cases,
physicians may even be penalized. Physicians are, therefore, essentially forced
to choose between potential medical malpractice lawsuits if they provide too
little care, or risk not getting paid for their services if they choose to provide
too much care, in the opinion of the HMO...19
This conflict presents pressing ethical issues as well as legal issues. One author
suggests that "physicians should be encouraged to act as agents of individuals and to
consider their [patients'] welfare above anything else. The use of financial incentive
arrangements to pressure physicians into keeping costs at a minimum will undoubtedly
present conflicts of interest between patients, physicians, and payers."2 In fact,

18

John G. Salmon, Lingating ClaimsAgainst'ilanagedHealth Care Organizations:Trendfor the 1990s, TRIAL,
February 1995, at 80, 80, citing Charles W. Wrightson, Jr., H1lO Rate Setting and FinancialStrategy 61
(1990).

19

Salmon. supra note 18, at 81.

20

Parise, supra note 12, at 989.
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concern over financial incentive arrangements is so great that the Stark Amendment,
ultimately enacted in 1991, now prohibits HMOs from "knowingly making a payment,
directly or indirectly, to a physician as an inducement to reduce or limit services
provided" to any Medicare or Medi-Cal beneficiary.21 As we shall see below, courts
are no longer reluctant to factor cost-containment measures into the allocation of
liability between a co-defendant's physician and managed care organization.
D. The Effect of MCO Involvement on the Standard of Medical Care
Assumptions about quality in health care and its defense are rooted in the past,
a past in which the doctor ruled. Strangely, these assumptions have survived
the revolutions that now deny the doctor the sole authority to judge and guide
care. The doctor no longer really controls health care, as in the days of solo
practice, but, when it comes to quality, the doctor is still held accountable..
. When the payers and the regulators turn on their searchlights, they want
doctors in their glare. Control is shifting, structure is shifting, the pattern of
care is shifting; but accountability is not.22
The physician working for an MCO surrenders some measure of control over her
autonomous judgment, since she is acting within a system that offers incentives for
perceived underutilization and punishments for overuse of medical resources,
particularly under the capitation system, where "the physicians share the profits if
fewer services than expected are provided and share the losses if the costs of
providing the needed services are greater than expected." 23 At the same time, case
law has made clear that MCO affiliation does not absolve the physician of legal
responsibility for the effects of her conduct.2 4 The physician is presumed to be the

21

Id.. paraphrasing the Stark Amendment, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1996).

22

William M. Sage et al., EnterpriseLiabilityforMedicalMalpracticeandHealth Care Quality Improvement,

20 AM. J.L. & MEDIcINE, 1, 1 (1994) (quotingDonald M. Berwick et al., CuringHealth Care: New Strategies
for Quality Improvement 12 (1990)). Sage and his co-authors offer the radical suggestion that MCOs should
be solely liable for negligent injury to enrollees caused by the health plan's affiliated practitioners and providers
and that physicians practicing as employees or under contract to the MCO should be immune from suit.
23

Carl H. Hitchner et al., IntegratedDelivery Systems: A Survey of OrganizationalModels, 29 WAKE FoREST
L. REv. 273,276 (1994).

24

See, e.g., Wickline v. State of California, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1986), rev. dismissed,
741 P.2d 613,239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1987), and progeny, discussed more fully below. The Wickline court made
clear that a physician has a legal obligation to actively object to an HMO policy when he believes that it will
result in a level of patient services that fall below the standard of care.
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gatekeeper, the person in the best position to assess the patient's needs and to
determine proper care.25
Courts face a dilemma in dealing fairly with malpractice claims when an MCO
doctor is sued:
Commentators have proposed that courts should allow MCO physicians to be
judged by a different standard of care than fee-for-service physicians, in
recognition of the different approach to care that MCOs have adopted to
control costs.

26

However, the scholars advancing this position go on to state that existing doctrines
for determining adherence to the standard of care should be sufficient to apply to all.
They claim that "[t]ort doctrine such as the 'best judgment rule,' the 'respectable
minority' doctrine, and the reliance on medical experts to establish the standard of
care, may well be sufficient to accommodate the more conservative, cost-effective
style. ))27
As courts and legislative bodies acknowledge cost-containment measures as
inevitable factors in health care delivery, the standard of medical care will change
accordingly. Advances in medicine already encourage this trend. For example,
surgery to remove a gall bladder used to require a five- to seven-day hospitalization.
With the advent of laparoscopic surgical techniques, the procedure can now be done
on an out-patient basis. An MCO is likely to encourage the less expensive
laparoscopic surgery. Thus, the standard of care shifts from five to seven days of
hospitalization to zero days of hospitalization. Interestingly, there can also be a
backlash effect; recently, hospitals have begun to keep women for a longer stay after
childbirth, because the costs of health care for infants and mothers discharged too
early began to be financially significant.
MCOs have certainly been characterized in the popular press as greedy
opportunists who force physicians to fall below the standard of acceptable medical
care in order to enhance profitability. 2 The January 1996 issue of Time Magazine
25

Linda 0. Prager, Gatekeepers on Trial: PrimaryCareLiability Risks areRising with Growth ofManaged
Care, AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS. Feb. 12, 1996, at 1,71.

26

Barn' R. Furrow et al., HEALTHLAw, 481 (1995).

27

Id. at 482.

28

MCOs use a variety of techniques as incentives for holding costs down, such as per diem payments to hospitals
or capitation arrangements with medical groups or physicians. A capitation program provides for a fixed
monthly payment from the MCO to the physician or physician group for each subscriber who selects the
physician as his or her primary care physician (sometimes referred to as the "gatekeeper"). Physicians absorb
all costs of that subscriber's medical care needs. Costs are paid from the pool of funds maintained by the
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contains a chilling article describing the struggle of Christy Demeurers, a Health Net
subscriber, who sought adequate treatment from the HMO for her cancer. The article
interweaves Christy's story with an expose of Health Net's corporate wheelings and
dealings as it amasses staggering profits by means of buy-outs and takeovers.29
In some cases, the popular press has blamed HMOs for events that were beyond
their direct control. For example, an article entitled Death by HMO: One Woman's
Horror Story, details the story of Karin Smith, who died at 29 after her cervical
cancer went undetected by a medical lab.3" The article implies that the HMO was at
fault, but does not clarify the nature of the HMO's involvement or the extent to which
it monitored laboratory practices and procedures.3 '
E. The Effect of the Capitation System
Capitation is a payment system in which the physician or the provider group is
paid a fixed periodic amount per patient in exchange for providing or arranging for
health care services for certain assigned MCO enrollees. The amount of
compensation is based on statistical expectations of services utilization for the patient
population in question, rather than on actual services rendered.32 The Health
Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 specifically allows HMOs to make
arrangements with physicians or other health professionals or institutions to assume
all or part of the financial risk on a prospective basis for the provision of basic health
care services by the physicians or other health professionals.33 This is often achieved
by a capitation system, which shifts the burden of the cost of medical care from the
MCO to the group and/or the physician. The MCO thus places the physician in the
precarious position of having to make decisions regarding the patient's health care that

physician. This practice of risk sharing can be implemented in a number of different ways but it shifts the cost
of health care from the MCO to the physician. As such, the MCO's profit is not entirely dependent on the
subscriber's actual health care costs.
29

Erik Larson, The Soul of an HMO, TIME MAGAZrNE, Jan. 22, 1996, at 44.

30

Edward Dolnick, Mhat Killed Karin Smith? GLAMOUR, Feb. 1996, at 158.

31

For example, if the MCO contracts with an outside laboratory that produces inaccurate test results, the extent
of HMO liability may be determined by the terms of the contract with the lab or the extent to which the MCO
is required to conduct quality control reviews. Of course, if the MCO owns the lab, its liability is clear. But if
the laboratory is a completely independent entity, any doctor who uses the lab would be misled by the same
erroneous test results, whether associated with an MCO or not.

32

Hitchner et al., supra note 23, at 304, n. 16. This article provides a comprehensive and detailed description of
various models of MCOs.

33

42 U.S.C.A. § 300e-l(4)(C)(ii) (West 1991).
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will directly affect the physician's financial well-being. Public policy would seem to
disfavor a system that provides incentives for limiting health care. Yet, this seems to
be the direction in which we are moving. The physician must always emphasize the
conflict created by capitation in any claim for indemnification against the MCO.
F. The Role of Managed Care in Malpractice Litigation
During the past twenty years, as managed health care has flourished, a plethora
of cases and federal and state legislation has attempted to effect, anticipate, or simply
keep up with these institutional changes.34 As the professional and legal relationships
among patients, physicians, and managed care organizations change dramatically,
medical malpractice litigation is in a constant state of flux. Much has been written
about the potential benefit to the plaintiff of including the managed care organization
as well as the physician as a co-defendant in a claim for medical malpractice; virtually
all of the material cited in this article is written from that point of view. It is
interesting to note that managed care has existed in this country for over half a
century, but malpractice claims against MCOs were only considered in 1975, and that
discussion took place in the scholarly literature rather than in a court action." Judicial
reluctance to allow an MCO as a co-defendant in a malpractice action appears to have
changed with the passage of the federal Health Maintenance Organization Act of
1973, discussed above. The Act is perceived to have endorsed the role of HMOs in
the delivery of health care, to have encouraged the proliferation of HMOs by
providing funding and, correspondingly, to have increased the potential for
malpractice litigation against managed care organizations.36
Less has been written that directly addresses the legal relationship between codefendants physician and MCO once an award has been granted to the plaintiff
patient, either by judgment or by settlement.37 What happens when the medical

34

This trend continues. In 1996, in California alone, more than eighty bills addressing the managed health care
industry were under consideration in the Legislature. See Sakson, supra note 1, at C1.

35

Tayebe Shah-Mirany, Alalpractice Liabilitvof HA'Os, 39 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q., AT 357,358 (1993), citing
William Curran and George Moseley., The 1tfalpracticeExperience ofHealth M1aintenance Organizations,70
Nw. U. L. REv. 69 (1975). Managed care organizations initially were thought to be immune from suit because
of the traditional prohibition against a corporation practicing medicine. See generally,Bearden & Maedgen,
supra note 3, for a discussion of the abandonment of this principle.

36

Shah-Mirany, supra note 35, at 358, n. 2.

37

An interesting law review article deals with the converse issue of HMO recovery from the physicians's
malpractice carrier. See Michael Roth et al., FinancialHealth of Health Care Providers:Do Third Party
PaVersPav?, 15 WHITTIER L. REv. 125 (1994). Such subrogation is based on the theory that the physician's
negligence causes the HMO to incur expenses for services it would not have provided absent the negligence.
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malpractice insurance carrier has paid the award and attempts to seek indemnification
from the MCO? The legal literature has largely ignored the rights of these codefendants against each other. This is particularly surprising in an area where
judgments and settlements are high and a great deal stands to be gained by reallocating the costs of such awards.
Often, medical malpractice insurance carriers representing physicians are on the
front line as far as malpractice awards are concerned. Until recently, physicians
working for MCOs have borne the brunt of malpractice settlements and judgments.38
MCOs originally attempted to defend against claims by invoking the characterization
favored by hospitals, in which the health care institution was protected from liability
because it was "a passive facility where independent practitioners attempt to meet the
medical needs of their patients."39 As discussed in greater detail below, recent judicial
opinions have tended to acknowledge the level of involvement of MCOs in health care
decisions. Nevertheless, the law is clear that physicians are still expected to exercise
independent judgment that complies with the acceptable standard of medical care,
regardless of whether the MCO has authorized treatment or not.40
The physiciant s hybrid status as ostensible employee/independent contractor lays
the foundation for the conflict between physician and MCO co-defendants in a claim
for indemnification. The physician seeks to have the court allocate a fair share of

The author quotes an MCO officer, who states with unapologetic candor that "careful handling of these kinds
of claims can add two to three percent to the bottom line of the HMO. This is found money." Id. at 125.
38 See Sage et al, supra note 22, at 3. The authors, who advocate full liability for HMOs and immunity for
physicians, describe both the public and judicial perception of accountability for health care services. They
speculate that "[w]e all feel a certain ambivalence about placing health care within an industrial model because
ofthe personal and humanitarian appeal engendered by illness and because of the intimacy with which we view
those who care for us." Id. at 4. The authors go on to state that "[miany observers believe that the roles of
management and provision of health care services can never merge.... Those who view management and
service provision to be as unmixable as oil and water cannot imagine that removing liability from 'front-line'
clinicians to 'bean counters' could possibly improve care." Id. at 5.
39

William J. Curran and George B. Moseley, MI, The Malpractice Experience of Health Maintenance
Organizations,70 Nw. U. L. Rev. 69, 73 (1975). Writing more than twenty years ago, the authors contend,
"... the law of medical malpractice for HMOs is virtually nonexistent. Consequently, HMO liability must be
analyzed by analogy, most profitably to the legal status of hospitals." Id.at 71. The authors also point out that
as early as 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to upset the decision in Darling v. Charlston Community
Memorial Hospital, 33 Il1.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 946 (1966). The authors
suggest that the U.S. Supreme Court "chose to recognize that the hospital now has become the focus of the total
health care delivery procedure, with the attending physician just one of many factors or resources determining
the quality or effectiveness of the procedure, over which the hospital has or should have primary control." The
authors also suggest that with Darlinglawmakers began to acknowledge that hospitals are liable for a wide
range of factors affecting the quality of health care, including the competence of non-employee physicians on
the hospital's medical staff. Id.

40

Prager, supra note 25, at 72.
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liability to the MCO, based on any practices or policies that contributed to the harm
to the patient such as the refusal to authorize certain tests or an adequate hospital
stay. The MCO inevitably defends against such liability by claiming that the doctor
acted as an independent contractor exercising her own judgment and skills. As we
shall see below, the results are mixed.
Generally, an employer is not liable for the negligence of an independent party
with whom the employer has contracted for services.41 The traditional view holds that
in the medical setting, physicians are usually treated as independent contractors rather
than employees; the hospital [and, by analogy, the MCO] is thus relieved of any
agency-based liability for their negligent acts.42
Courts early rejected the defense that a health care institution cannot be a
participant, in malpractice. Earlier cases involved hospitals rather than MCOs as the
institutional defendant, but the logic applies to the managed care context.43 As early
as 1980, the court in Capan v. Divine Providence Hospital44 looked beyond the
technical formalities of the doctor/hospital relationship in order to hold the hospital
liable for malpractice even though it claimed to have played a passive institutional
role.
Recent courts have been ready and willing to apply the doctrine of institutional
liability to MCOs. In the absence of a true staff model, courts have imputed a closer
employer/employee relationship, thus paving the way for vicarious liability or
ostensible agency causes of action. For example, in Sloan v. MetropolitanHealth
Council ofIndianapolis,Inc., the Sloans sued the named HMO for negligent failure
to diagnose. The HMO defended against the claim by contending that its physicians
acted independently in their practice of medicine and were not subject to control by
the HMO over their diagnosis or treatment decisions, despite quality control reviews.
The HMO claimed it had no veto power over tests, diagnoses, prescriptions or
treatments and also invoked the rule legally prohibiting a corporation from practicing
medicine. The Indiana appellate court rejected the HMO's defense, stating that there

41

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 409 (1965).

42

Furrow et al., supra note 26, at 482.

43

In terms of litigation, hospitals were the first institutional providers of health care, and their role served to defeat
the legal notion that corporations cannot practice medicine. MCOs, the new institutional "player" in the health
care industry, should logically come within the ambit of hospital liability doctrine. However, some scholars have
expressed reservations about automatically assuming that theories of liability historically applied against hospitals
for the malpractice of physicians apply to MCOs, which have a very different relationship with physicians. See
Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 3. at 9.

44

207 Pa. Super. 364,430 A.2d 647 (1980).

45

516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. App. 1987).
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was substantial evidence that the physician was under the HMO's control, in large part
because such control was exercised by its medical director, a physician himself
Although this logic sounds rather forced, the court concluded that the control was
sufficient to "establish an employment relationship where the employee performed
acts within the scope of his [sic] employment. "46
In a federal court case, Schleier v. KaiserFoundationHealth Plan,4 7 HMO Kaiser
was held vicariously liable for malpractice committed by an independent consulting
physician. The consultant had been engaged by an HMO doctor and was supervised
by him. The HMO had the right to discharge the consultant. This was deemed to be
sufficient evidence of Kaiser's control over his behavior and permitted the court to
impute agency.
In a third case, Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center,48 a state court was
willing to hold an HMO liable in a malpractice action because the plaintiffs decision
to subscribe indicated that he looked to the institution for care and not solely to the
physicians and that he detrimentally relied on the plan's representations. 49 Thus, the
malpractice carrier seeking indemnification from an MCO must be prepared to
produce evidence consistent with an employer/employee relationship. This would
include facts pertaining to MCO control such as distinct oversight by the medical
director, the right of denial or approval of tests and procedures, control over the
length of hospital stays, utilization review, monitoring of services for quality control,
and the perceptions of subscribers based on representations by the MCO.
G. The Role of Managed Care in Claims for Indemnification
This article discusses the developing legal rights of physicians and their medical
malpractice insurance carriers against MCOs. We suggest that malpractice insurers
seeking indemnification from an MCO must take into consideration a number of
factors in seeking repayment, including: formulation of a viable theory of recovery

46

Id. at 1109.

47

876 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

48

377 Pa. Super. 609, 547 A.2d 1229 (1988).

49 Id. at 615,547 A.2d at 1232. But see: Williams v. Good Health Plus, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. App. 1987)
and Raglin v. HMO Illinois, Inc., 230 fI1. App. 2d 642,595 N.E.2d 153 (1992) in which claims of HMO liability
based on such representations were rejected. In Raglin, the fact that the MCO was based on an IPA model was
fatal to the contract claim.
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against the MCO based on applicable tort and contract doctrine"°; selection of an
effective litigation strategy: 51 careful assessment of any actions by the court in the
instant case or of the effect of a settlement agreement with one party; working
knowledge of the developing relevant case law:52 understanding of the advantages
and limitations imposed by state and federal statutory authority and administrative
law; familiarity with specific contract provisions which may affect the efforts of the
malpractice carrier to obtain reimbursement; and awareness of public policy
considerations which may serve to protect or expose the MCO.
II. EQUITABLE INDEMNIFICATION
AS THE BASIS OF RECOVERY FROM AN MCO
The cases described above lay the foundation for litigation against physicians and
MCOs as co-defendants, but they do not reach the secondary issue that arises when
the MCO physician's malpractice insurance carrier has paid a malpractice judgment
or settlement and is now attempting to obtain indemnification from the MCO. The
malpractice carrier, similar to the patient plaintiff, must base such a claim on the
theory that cost-containment measures or other MCO policies caused the physician's
conduct to fall below the standard of medical care, or that there was
misrepresentation or grounds for a finding of ostensible agency. Since there is no case
law directly on point, the malpractice insurer must appropriate a legal theory allowing
it by analogy to shift all or part of the liability to the MCO.
The California Court of Appeal has defined indemnification as an obligation
resting on one party, the indemnitor, to make good a loss or damage that is incurred

50

It should be noted at this point that plaintiffs have been generally unsuccessful in bringing claims for breach of
contract against MCOs. See generally Pulvers v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 99 Cal. App. 3d 560, 564565, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392,393 (1979) (rejecting patient's breach of warranty claim against MCO and dismissing
claims based on what the court considered "generalized puffing" in promotional literature promising high
standards of medical services). Butsee Depenbrok v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 79 Cal. App. 3d 167, 171
144 Cal. Rptr. 724, 726 (1978) (permitting malpractice action against MCO to sound in contract [breach of
warranty] where patient detrimentally relied on specific promises made by surgeon). Since the terms of the
plaintiffs contractual agreement with an MCO are different from those in a physician's contractual arrangement
with the same organization, analysis of plaintiff patient causes of action has limited application to a malpractice
insurance carrier's pursuit of indemnification from an MCO.

51

This could include preservation of the right to request indemnification by cross-complaining against the HMO
at the time the complaint is filed (the preferred strategy); filing an independent action for indemnification after
conclusion of the original plaintiffs action; or filing a postjudgment motion for contribution among tortfeasors.
Practitioners should consult the relevant case law and statutory sections set forth in chapter 300 (Indemnity and
Contribution) of CALIFORNIA FORMS OF PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE (Matthew Bender 1995), at 89.

52

The malpractice carrier should be aware that these cases do not necessarily involve MCOs. They do, however,
provide an expansive legal theory which may provide a strong basis for an indemnification claim.
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53
by another party, the indemnitee, in the absence of an express indemnity agreement.
The California Civil Code defines indemnity as "a contract by which one engages to
save another from a legal consequence of the conduct of one of the parties, or of
some other person."54
Claims for indemnification can be based in contract or tort. A physician may be
entitled to indemnification for a malpractice award based on: (1) an express
contractual indemnity provision or (2) a determination of comparative liability among
tortfeasors. 55 Courts may also derive a third basis for indemnification from public
policy concerns.
Express contractual indemnity is governed by California Civil Code sections 2772
through 2784.5.56 Public policy considerations are addressed in California Civil Code
section 1668, 57 which deals with contracts exempting an indemnitor from liability for
fraud, willful injury, or violation of law. Statutory provisions, which are framed in the
language of contribution among joint obligers or tortfeasors, must be harmonized with
judicially established principles of comparative negligence, discussed more fully
below.58 The case law is generally considered to have superseded statutory provisions
using contributory negligence concepts. This is because the courts attempt to render
decisions regarding indemnification that are consistent with the modern doctrine of
comparative negligence.
Because MCOs are unlikely to include an express provision in provider contracts
agreeing to indemnify physicians for malpractice claims, the malpractice insurer is
likely to be required to invoke a tort theory for recovery. The doctrine of equitable
indemnification is best suited to a claim for recovery against the MCO. Restatement
(Second) of Torts states in pertinent part that the theory of equitable indemnification
can be invoked to provide restitution in a variety of contexts:

53

See Regional Steel Corp. v. Super. Ct., 25 Cal. App. 4th 525,528, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 417,418 (1994).

54

CAL. CIV. CODE

55

See 5 BERNARD WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §§ 89-104 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995) for an
explanation of the doctrinal bases of indemnification in California.

56

CAL. Civ. CODE

§§ 2772-2784.5 (West 1993). See also note 11 supra regarding hold-harmless clauses.

57

CAL. CIV. CODE

§

58

The contribution doctrine of California Civil Code sections 875, 876, and 878-880 (West Supp. 1996) is difficult to

§ 2772

(West 1993).

1668 (West 1985). See also note 11 supra.

reconcile with the comparative liability policy announced by the California Supreme Court in American Motorcycle
Association v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978), but

the statutory language remains unmodified despite the action of the courts.
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(1) If two persons are liable in tort to a third person for the same harm and
one of them discharges the liability of both, he [sic] is entitled to indemnity
from the other if the other would be unjustly enriched at his expense by the
discharge of the liability.
(2) Instances in which indemnity is granted under this principle include the
following:
(a) The indemnitee was liable only vicariously for the conduct of the
indemnitor;
(b) The indemnitee acted pursuant to directions of the indemnitor and
reasonably believed the directions to be lawful;
(c) The indemnitee was induced to act by a misrepresentation on the part
of the indemnitor, upon which he [sic] justifiably relied. 9
Under evolving case law involving physicians and MCOs as co-tortfeasors, the
physician paying an award and seeking reimbursement from the HMO would most
likely want to invoke subsections (2)(b) and (2)(c) as persuasive authority. The MCO
seeking indemnification from the physician would rely on subsection (2)(a).
A. Equitable Indemnification Defined by the California Courts
The right to equitable indemnification, also referred to as comparative indemnity
or implied indemnity, may be express or implied. ° Originally, indemnification was an
all-or-nothing proposition. An indemnitee was entitled only to recover full repayment
or nothing at all. However, the California Supreme Court has stated that a single
"comparative indemnity doctrine" applies in this state, permitting partial
indemnification on a comparative fault basis or allowing a total shift of liability, as
determined on a case-by-case basis. 1

59

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B(1) & (2)(a-c) (1979).

60

Equitable indemnification is applied in different contexts under various names. For example, the court in
Angelus Associates Corp. v. Neonex Leisure Prods., Inc. 167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 213 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1985)
referred to implied equitable indemnity, partial equitable indemnity, and comparative equitable indemnity; the
court in Bay Dev. Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 50 Cal. 3d 1012, 269 Cal. Rptr. 720, 722, 791 P.2d 290, 292 (1990)
referred to implied contractual indemnity.

61

See Far West Fin. Corp. v. D & S Co., 46 Cal. 3d 796, 799, 760 P.2d 399, 400, 251 Cal. Rptr. 202, 203
(1988).
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In AmericanMotorcycle Association v. SuperiorCourt of Los Angeles County,62
the California Supreme Court abandoned all-or-nothing recovery as an exclusive
indemnification rule. The American Motorcycle court established the availability of
partial equitable indemnification on a comparative fault basis.
B. Equitable Indemnification Consistent with Principles of Contributory
Negligence: Early Applications
The principle of equitable indemnification was first applied in California in 1958
in City and County of San Franciscov. Ho Sing.63 The City of San Francisco and
contractor Ho Sing were sued by a plaintiff who was injured when she tripped over
a sidewalk skylight. The City paid a substantial part of the judgment and sought to
recover the expenditure from Ho Sing, who now owned the skylight. The City based
its demand for indemnification on the fact that Ho Sing's predecessor had actively
engaged in the negligent alteration of the sidewalk for its own benefit, while the City
merely had a passive duty to keep the sidewalk safe. In ordering Ho Sing to
indemnify the City for its award to the plaintiff, the Ho Sing court relied on an early
United States Supreme Court decision, Washington Gas Company v. District of
Columbia.6 The Court in Washington Gas had abandoned the traditional notion that
the law will not abet wrongdoers - i.e., co-tortfeasors - in obtaining relief and had
instead stated:
The principle of equitable indemnity qualifies and restrains within just limits the
rigor of the rule which forbids recourse between wrongdoers... The rule is, in
pari delicto, potior est conditio defendantis. If the parties are not equally
criminal, the principal delinquent may be held responsible to his co-delinquent for
damages incurred by their joint offense.65
In Ho Sing, the municipality had a general duty to maintain the sidewalk but was
only passively negligent in causing the injury. Ho Sing's predecessor had altered the
sidewalk and thus had actively caused the harm. The court found that the passive
tortfeasor was entitled to indemnification from the active tortfeasor. Such distinctions
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20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).

63

51 Cal. 2d 127, 330 P.2d 802 (1958).

64

161 U.S. 316 (1896).

65

Id. at327-328, citedinHoSing,51 Cal. 2dat 133,330P.2dat805.
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in the nature of the conduct of co-tortfeasors were acknowledged as the basis for
indemnification.
The California Court of Appeal in Alisal SanitaryDistrictv. Kennedy,66 a 1960
decision, affirmed the concept of equitable indemnification, although it too held that
the doctrine of equitable indemnification was available only to shift the entire liability
for the payment of the award from a passive tortfeasor to an active tortfeasor. This
approach was consistent with the principles of contributory negligence which were
still good law at the time the cause of action arose. The Alisal court expressed a
willingness to consider "differences in the character or kind of wrongs which cause
the injury and in the nature of the legal obligation owed by each of the wrongdoers
to the injured person."67 The court used the terminology of primary/secondary
liability rather than active/passive liability, explaining:
The right of indemnity rests upon a difference between the primary and
secondary fault of two persons each of whom is made responsible by law to
an injured party. It is a right which inures to a person who, without active
fault on hispart, has been compelled by reason of some legal obligation, to
pay damages occasioned by the initial negligence of another, and for which he
himself is only secondarily liable [emphasis added].68
Although the Alisal holding inured to the benefit of the passive defendant (which
would be the role played by the MCO), it broke new ground with the theory of
primary and secondary liability. The Alisal court stated that secondary liability "may
be imputed or constructive only, being based on some legal relationship between the
parties, or arising from some positive rule of common or statutory law or because of
a failure to discover or correct a defect or remedy a dangerous condition caused by
the act of the one primarily responsible."69 In light of Alisal, the legal relationship
between a physician and an MCO, however complex, must be sufficient to support a
claim of vicarious liability in order to satisfy this legal requirement.
The principle of equitable indemnification based on principles of contributory
negligence/total recovery was affirmed in extremely broad language in 1964 by the
California Court of Appeal in Herrerov. A tkinson, which stated that:
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180 Cal. App. 2d 69, 75,4 Cal. Rptr. 379, 383 (1960).

67

Id.

68

Id., citing Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322,325-326, 77 A.2d 368,370 (1951).

69

Id. at 75, 4 Cal. Rptr at 383.
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[t]he duty to indemnify may arise, and indemnity may be allowed in those fact
situations where in equity and good conscience the burden of the judgment
should be shifted from the shoulders of the person seeking indemnity to the
one from whom indemnity is sought. The right depends upon the principle that
everyone is responsible for the consequences of his own wrong, and others
have been compelled to pay damages which ought to have been paid by the
wrongdoer, they may recover from him.7"
The Herrero court focused on the injustice that occurs when one defendant
assumes the burden of the entire liability. It affirmed that indemnification is a legal
fight in and of itself which exists as a right of restitution and is a flexible doctrine
dependent on "the facts of each case."'" The holding in Herrero is framed in language
broad enough to apply to indemnification rights of both the primary and the secondary
tortfeasor against each other.
C. Equitable Indemnification Interpreted Under Modern Principles of
Comparative Negligence
Courts were naturally reluctant to require indemnification under the all-or-nothing
approach dictated by contributory negligence. Shifting the full burden from one
tortfeasor to another often exceeded the demands of equity imposed by a specific set
of circumstances. A major change applicable to equitable indemnification came about
when California abandoned the common law doctrine of contributory negligence. In
1975, the California Supreme Court in Li v. Yellow Cab held that:
the "all-or-nothing" rule of contributory negligence as it presently exists in this
state should be and is herewith superseded by a system of "pure" comparative
negligence, the fundamental purpose of which shall be to assign responsibility
and liability for damage in direct proportion to the amount of negligence of
72
each of the parties.
While the holding of the California Supreme Court applied to an injured plaintiff and
a single tortfeasor, the abandonment of contributory negligence signaled a
corresponding change in philosophy regarding equitable indemnification. That change
occurred three years after Li v. Yellow Cab in American Motorcycle Association v.

70

227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 74, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490,493 (1964).

71

Id.

72

13 Cal. 3d 804, 828, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 19 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975).
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Superior Court of Los Angeles County," mentioned in section II.A, above. In
AmericanMotorcycle, a teenage boy was injured in a motorcycle race sponsored by
the American Motorcycle Association. The Association attempted to cross-complain
against the parents of the boy, alleging that the parents negligently failed to supervise
the minor child. The California Supreme Court ordered a hearing on its own motion
and issued a writ directing the trial court to grant the Association leave to file the
proposed cross-complaint. The California Supreme Court stated:
In order to attain such a system, in which liability for an indivisible injury
caused by concurrent tortfeasors will be borne by each individual tortfeasor
"in direct proportion to [his] respective fault," we conclude that the current
equitable indemnity rule should be modified to permit a concurrent tortfeasor
to obtain partial indemnity from other concurrent tortfeasors on a comparative
fault basis.74
D. Policy-Based Limitations on Equitable Indemnification
Despite the expanded potential for recovery available to the malpractice insurance
carrier under an equitable indemnification theory that employs comparative negligence
principles, a number of limitations exist. These include participation by one or more
of the co-defendants in a good-faith settlement agreement and common-law and
statutory restrictions on equitable indemnification.
1. Good Faith Settlement
California courts favor settlement, and the majority of cases do settle. In
American Motorcycle, the California Supreme Court identified and emphasized the
"strong public policy in favor of encouraging settlement of litigation."" Since
settlement precludes repayment by the settling codefendant, this is significant dicta.
A good-faith settlement discharges the settling tortfeasor from all liability for
equitable indemnification to any other parties.76 The California Code of Civil
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20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).

74

Id. at 598, 578 P.2d at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195.

75

Id. at 603, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.

76

For agood discussion of factors the courts xill look to in determining the "good faith" of any settlement entered
into by a plaintiffand co-defendant tortfeasor sufficient to bar a non-settling co-defendant's claim for equitable
indemnification, see Tech-bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159,213 Cal.
Rptr. 256 (1985). For further analysis of the effect of a good faith settlement as it relates to the passive-active
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Procedure provides statutory authority governing the release of one or more joint
tortfeasors or co-obligers and the effect upon the liability of others. It provides in
pertinent part:
Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue
or not enforce a judgment is given in good faith before a verdict or judgment
to one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same
tort... [i]t shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability
for any contribution to any other tortfeasors. 7
Conversely, the California Court of Appeal has held that a settling tortfeasor may
recover equitable indemnification from a nonsettling tortfeasor. 78 Finally, a good faith
settlement by one tortfeasor will not bar the remaining co-defendant tortfeasors from
pursuing an equitable indemnification claim against a settling co-defendant tortfeasor
when such fight to equitable indemnification arises out of an express right in a
Thus, the carrier would preserve the right to obtain indemnification
contract.79
from the MCO even if it settles with the plaintiff prior to a judgment. However, the
malpractice carrier can be precluded from indemnification if the MCO settles. If the
MCO settles and the malpractice carrier has reason to believe that the settlement is
grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person at the time of settlement would
estimate the settlor's liability to be,8" the malpractice carrier can institute judicial
proceedings to determine the good faith of the settlement. 8 '

classification oftortfeasors for equitable indemnification purposes, see Far West Finan. Corp. v. D & S Co., 46
Cal. 3d 796,760 P.2d 399. 251 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1988).
77

CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 877(b) (West Supp. 1996).

78

Bolamperti v. Larco Mfg., 164 Cal. App. 3d 249,210 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1985).

79

C.L. Peck Contractors v. Super. Ct., 159 Cal. App. 3d 828, 205 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1984).

80

Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates, 38 Cal. 3d 488,698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).

81

California Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 (West Supp. 1996) covers both joint tortfeasors and coobligers in contract. It states: "Any party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are joint
tortfeasors or co-obligers on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a
settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors . . . (2) In the
altcrnative, a settling party may give notice of settlement to all parties and to the court, together with an
application for determination of good faith settlement and a proposed order... "
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2 MICRA Limitations on the Size of Noneconomic Awards
In Western Steamship Lines v. San Pedro Hospital,82 the California Supreme
Court determined that the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975
(MICRA)83 reflects "a strong public policy to contain the costs of malpractice
insurance by controlling or redistributing liability for damages, thereby maximizing the
availability of medical services to meet the state's health care needs." 4 The court in
Western Steamship Lines held that MICRA's $250,000 limitation [on noneconomic
damages] applies to an action for equitable indemnification against a hospital and
doctor.8 5 It should be noted that the original judgment in Western was made under
federal maritime law; initial application of California law might have produced a
different result.
If the physician's medical malpractice carrier wishes to pursue indemnification
from the MCO, it may be possible to apply the public policy argument in Western as
the basis for an argument in favor of shifting a portion of a damage award apportioned
to the physician to the HMO. One basic premise of tort law is to use insurance to
relieve the individual of the burden of damages by spreading the cost over a broader
portion of the population. Insurance companies pay damage awards and apportion
the cost in the form of rates to their insureds. In this way, each member of society
pays a small portion of many injury awards. Distributing injury awards among the
largest number of insureds lowers the cost per person. It may be possible to argue
that shifting damage awards from the malpractice carrier to MCOs is justified if the
MCO membership base is larger than the malpractice insurer's policyholder base. 6

82

8 Cal. 4th 100, 876 P.2d 1062, 32 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1994).

83

MICRA is codified at California Civil Code section 3333.2 (West Supp. 1996). It limits the size of any award

for noneconomic damages in an action against a health care provider to S250,000.
84

8 Cal. 4th at 104, 876 P.2d at 1063, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 264.

85

Id. Noneconomic damages generally include pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional
distress, loss of companionship or consortium, and injury to reputation. Economic damages include medical
expenses, loss of earnings or employment, and other quantifiable expenses. See CAL. CIV.
Supp. 1996) for a more comprehensive list of the different damages.

86 See Sage et al, supra note 22, for a cogent discussion of malpractice insurance theory.

CODE

§ 1431.2 (West
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3. Potential Pre-emption by ERISA
Other limitations on the usefulness of the doctrine of equitable indemnification are
imposed by ERISA, the federal Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. 87
ERISA contains broad preemption provisions that may interfere with the state claims
when a claim "has a 'connection to or reference to' a benefit plan."88 If ERISA
precludes a patient's state-law malpractice claim against both the physician and the
MCO, any discussion of indemnification in state court is moot, since the action could
be shifted to federal court. If ERISA is interpreted to preempt claims against the
MCO only, the doctor could be made to assume full liability and the malpractice
carrier would forfeit any right of indemnification arising out of that action. The
physician and malpractice carrier are well advised to attempt to guard against such a
result.
Whether a malpractice claim is "related" to a benefit plan per the language in
ERISA remains to be settled by the courts. For example, the federal district court in
Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith89 denied an HMO's request for an injunction
against a patient malpractice claim. The HMO argued that the claim was blocked by
ERISA pre-emption. The court allowed the malpractice claim against both physician
and HMO, reasoning that the injury itself had nothing to do with denial of rights under
the plan itself, but other courts have disagreed.9" Still, the California Court of Appeal
87 ERISA is codified at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996).
88 See, e.g, Elsesser v. Hosp. of Philadelphia College, 802 F. Supp. 1286, 1289-91 (E.D. Penn. 1992) (allowing
a claim against an HMO when it was demonstrated that the claim was not based on obligations under the
HMO's benefit plan).
89

733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Penn. 1990).

90 Id. at 988. For the U.S. Supreme Court's rather ambiguous definition of law that "relates to" an employee
benefit plan, see Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983). For a good discussion of the types of claims
allowed under "the broad sweep of ERISA," see Lane v. Goren, 743 F.2d 1337, 1339 (9th Cir. 1984).
In Ricci v. Goobennan, 840 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1993), the U.S. District Court granted an HMO's motion to
dismiss a patient's state tort claim that her HMO was vicariously liable for alleged medical malpractice of one
of its providers, where the vicarious liability claim "related to" an employee benefit plan and stating that ERISA
preempted the claim.
In Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare H.M.O., 844 F. Supp. 966,973 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), the U.S. District Court granted
defendant's motion for dismissal of a complaint, holding that the plaintiffs claims for breach of contract in
misrepresentation, wrongful death, loss of consortium and breach of fiduciary duty arose out of alleged improper
provision of health care against an HMO provided under a health care plan offered aspart of an employee
benefit plan provided by an employer.
Most recently, the Pennsylvania Superior Court denied a motion for summary judgment based on an ERISA
preemption defense by an HMO, stating, "We, too, do not believe that Congress can have intended, prior even
to invention of the cost containment system which inheres in USHC's [the defendant HMO] review process,
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is generally on record as stating that absent an express Congressional command, state
law is preempted by ERISA only if the state law actually conflicts with the federal
statute or if the federal statute thoroughly occupies the legislative field.91
IV. DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE THEORY
FOR PURSUING MCO INDEMNIFICATION
A. Procedural Considerations
One of the fundamental principles of equitable indemnification is "there can be no
indemnity without liability. ' 92 In order for a physician or her malpractice carrier to
bring an action against an MCO for equitable indemnification, the MCO must be
shown to have engaged in some type of culpable activity, either as an express or
implied co-obligor in contract or as a co-tortfeasor. Given the trend in the courts
toward holding MCOs responsible for negligence in provision of medical care, it is
unlikely that a plaintiff patient today would fail to name the MCO as a defendant in
a medical malpractice action. The physician has three procedural options and a wide
range of legal theories on which to base his demand for indemnification. Because
every contract contains distinct provisions affecting the relative liability of physician
and MCO, we focus our discussion on recovery in tort actions.93
A co-defendant tortfeasor must generally elect one of two litigation strategies in
order to obtain equitable indemnification: (1) by filing a cross-complaint for

to foreclose recovery to plan beneficiaries injured by negligent medical decisions." Pappas v. Asbel v. U.S.
Healthcare Systems of Pa., Inc., 1996 WL 112981 (Pa. Super. March 15, 1996). The Pappascourt relied in
part on its earlier decision in McClellan v. HMO ofPennsylvania, 413 Pa. Super. 128, 604 A.2d 1053 (1992),
holding that negligence claims are not related to ERISA benefits or administration and are not preempted by it.
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 1978) held
that "The clear wording of section 514 and the relevant legislative history show that Congress unmistakably
intended ERISA to preempt a state law such as Knox-Keene that directly regulates employee benefit plans."
The Ninth Circuit in Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1985) rejected an employer's denial of
benefits as arbitrary and capricious, but held that ERISA preempted employees' common-law theories of breach
of contract implied in fact, promissory estoppel, estoppel by conduct, fraud and deceit, and breach of contract.

91

Solorzano v. Super. Ct., 10 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 161 (1992), review deified 1993.

92

Munoz v. Davis, 141 Cal. App. 3d 420,428, 190 Cal. Rptr. 400,406 (1983).

93

CALIFORNIA FORMS OF PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE, supra note 51, offers a comprehensive review of doctrine,
case law, and statutory authority related to indemnification claims based on contract theory. General principles
must, of course, be harmonized with specific provisions in Health and Safety Code sections covering HMO
regulation. See CAL. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE §§ 1367 et seq. (West 1990 & Supp. 1996).
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declaratory relief concerning the right to indemnity against the indemnitor in the suit
brought by the plaintiff, whether or not the indemnitor is already a party to the
action;94 or (2) by filing an independent action for indemnification against the
indemnitor after conclusion of the original plaintiffs action.95 A third option is a
postjudgment motion for "contribution among tortfeasors."96 If the first option is
selected, the insurance carrier must remain "invisible" in order to avoid prejudicing
the outcome against the physician, despite the carrier's substantial interest in the
lawsuit. Only under the most unusual circumstances would the carrier attempt to
intervene; the physician's cross-complaint against the MCO should be sufficient to
preserve the rights of the carrier in subsequent litigation under the second option.97
Note also that the third approach may be risky. Courts may object to the statutory
language in section 878, which is based on the principles of contributory negligence
superseded by American Motorcycle.
The right of a co-defendant to seek equitable indemnification may be precluded
by collateral estoppel ifthe co-defendant indemnitor is determined to have no liability
to the plaintiff in pretrial proceedings. For example, the court might grant a motion
to dismiss or enter a summary judgment in favor of the defendant. However,
collateral estoppel does not apply if the plaintiffs complaint and the defendant's cross
complaint for comparative negligence assert different theories of liability.98

94

See American Motorcycle Assn. v. Super. Ct., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 19 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975. See
also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 86 (a)(7)(A) (West Supp. 1996) and Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 428.10(b) (1973).
A very recent case in Pennsylvania, Pappas v. Asbel, 1996 WL 112981 (Pa. Super. March 15, 1996), involved
claims by HMO subscriber Pappas of medical malpractice by a doctor and negligence by the hospital for
delaying transfer of the patient to a facility equipped to address the medical emergency in question. The hospital
then filed a third-party complaint against the HMO, joining it as a party defendant for its refusal to authorize the
transfer of the plaintiff to the hospital selected by its physicians. The doctor filed a cross-claim against the HlMO
seeking contribution and/or indemnity. The HMO raised the defense of ERISA preemption. The Pennsylvania
Superior Court reversed the trial courts order granting summary judgment, emphasizing that ERISA preemption
was not a valid defense, and remanded. Although the merits of the cross-complaint by the doctor are yet to be
decided, the court did not dismiss them outright.
ERISA issues are discussed in section II.D.3 of this article.

95 See County of Riverside v. Loma Linda Univ., 118 Cal. App. 3d 300, 315-316, 173 Cal. Rptr. 371, 378
(1981).
96

CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 878 (West 1980).

97 See Roth etal.,stpra note 37, for a discussion of the rights of MCOs against physicians. See also, Sage et al,
supra note 22, in which the authors propose to shift liability entirely to MCOs.
98 Frank v. State ofCalifornia, 205 Cal. App. 3d 488,491-495,252 Cal. Rptr. 410,411-414 (1988).
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The California Fair Responsibility Act, originally referred to as Proposition 51,"
also affects the ability to seek indemnification. The Act effectively destroys several
liability among co-obligers under certain conditions. It provides that in personal
injury actions based on principles of comparative fault, "[e]ach defendant shall be
liable only for the amount of noneconomic damages allocated to that defendant in
direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault." 1" Thus, the trial court must
fully apportion damages among all co-tortfeasors (including both named and unnamed
defendants) pursuant to the plaintiffs theory. Although this appears to vest a good
deal of control in the plaintiff, in fact it shifts the risk to the plaintiff, who must now
collect noneconomic damages from each individual defendant; one co-defendant
cannot be compelled to assume full responsibility for the entire judgment with the
expectation that he or she will obtain indemnification for such a pay-out at a later
time. In the event that co-defendant lacks coverage or the ability to pay, the risk is
shifted from the defendants to the plaintiff' 0
B. Case Law Establishing Direct Liability of MCOs
and Providing the Basis for Indemnification Claims
Malpractice carriers seeking indemnification from MCOs need to formulate a
theory of recovery to support their demand. Because there are no cases directly on
point, the theory behind the claim for recovery must be derived from the doctrine that
has evolved through patient litigation against MCOs or other related third-party
payers. Ironically, the carrier will find itself recapitulating many of the same
arguments used in patient/plaintiff claims.
In California, the first case to attempt to link a third-party payor into the medical
malpractice causation chain under a corporate negligence theory based on a utilization
decision was Wickline v. State of California.1°2 In this case, the third party payor was
the State of California through its administration of the Medi-Cal Program, a different
type of managed care organization. In Wickline, the state had allowed only a four-day
hospital stay for Mrs. Wickline after surgery resulted in medical complications. Mrs.
99

CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1431-1431.5 (West Supp. 1996).

100 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(a) (West Supp. 1996).
101 The practitioner will find a good introductory discussion of Prop 51 in the May, 1994 update to the CALIFORNIA
TORT GUIDE, a Continuing Education of the Bar publication by Jeffrey J. Carlson.
102 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1986). See also Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial
Hosp., 33 1l1.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1986), discussed briefly in note 39
supra. Darlingwasthe first case to recognize hospital liability for corporate negligence based on duties unique
to the health care institution such as provision of adequate staffing, use of proper standards in granting hospital
privileges, and employment of proper health care quality control measures.

[Vol.7:1 1996]

INDEMNIFICATION AND MCOs

Wickline's attending physicians had requested a stay of eight days. The plaintiff
alleged direct corporate liability. The court was particularly concerned with the
adequacy of the utilization review conducted by the Medi-Cal doctor; it expressed
wariness that cost-consciousness might interfere with good medical judgment.10
The issue of liability of a third party payor for early release based on costcontainment considerations was never squarely addressed by the Wickline court
because the court ruled in favor of the State and based liability solely on the
physician's duty to the patient. The Wickline court did remark, however, that under
other circumstances cost-containment programs cannot be allowed to "corrupt
medical judgment."'" The court found that the treating physician was liable because
"while still of the subjective, non-communicated,opinion that Wickline was seriously
ill and that the danger to her was not over, [he] discharged her from the hospital..
",105

In assigning full liability to the physicians and none to the Medi-Cal program, the
court further commented on the effects of the changing relationship between the
physician and third-party payers such as Medi-Cal. It stated that the physician must
rely on his own judgment: "There is little doubt that [the treating physician] was
intimidated by the Medi-Cal program but he was not paralyzed by [Medi-Cal's]
response nor rendered powerless to act appropriately if other action was required
under the circumstances. 0 ' However, the Wickline court qualified the MCO
physician's responsibility:
Third party payers of health care services can be held legally accountable
when medically inappropriate decisions result from defects in the design or
implementation of cost containment mechanisms as, for example, when
appeals made on a patient's behalf for medical or hospital care are arbitrarily
ignored or unreasonably disregarded or overridden.'a 7
The court in Wickline implied that a physician's liability can preclude shifting
responsibility to the MCO or other third-party payor unless the physician first
provides and communicates sufficient medical information to the payor to adequately
notify the payor of the patient's medical needs. If necessary, the physician has the
103 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 1634,239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 812 (1986).

104 Id. at 1647, 239 Cal Rptr. at 820.
105 Id. at 1640, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 815 (emphasis added).

106 Id. at 1645, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
107 Id.
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affirmative burden of challenging the decision made by the payor. At the same time,
Wickline places payers on notice that liability may result from administrative decisions
that are based on cost-containment considerations and which are not based on the
patient's medical needs if such decisions injure the patient.
Four years after Wickline, the California Court of Appeal issued a second opinion
in Wilson v. Blue Cross of So. California,a case in which the plaintiff also alleged
corporate negligence based on improper utilization review."' 8 The Wilson court
revisited the Wickline decision and rejected the idea of exclusive physician liability
when a third-party payor makes decisions affecting medical services: "The language
in Wickline which suggests that civil liability for a discharge decision rests solely
within the responsibility of a treating physician in all contexts is dicta."' 9 The Wilson
court, which found defendant Blue Cross to be negligent in failing to authorize
adequate hospitalization for a depressed patient who subsequently committed suicide,
rejected Blue Cross's argument that under Wickline, cost-containment measures were
valid public policy. Although the Wilson court was willing to acknowledge the value
of such objectives for public systems, it distinguished this policy from the profit
motive of a private health care organization." 0
In Bush v. Dake, an unpublished 1989 case filed in Sagninaw County, Michigan,'
the plaintiff asserted that the capitation arrangement with her HMO provided
physicians with an incentive for "not rendering services, not referring to specialists,
not admitting to hospitals, and ... conducting audits of Pap test utilization" in a
manner that violated acceptable standards of medical practice, ethics, morality and
public policy." 2 The plaintiff alleged that the capitation arrangement was a
"significant causative factor" in the resulting malpractice by physicians. The trial
court held that the plaintiffs theory was viable and could proceed to the jury, although
it did comment that the state legislature approved HMOs and thus there was no

108 222 Cal. App. 3d 660, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1990).
109 Id. at 666-667, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 879-880.
110 Id. at 664, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 87. See also Fox v. Health Net, No. 21962 (Cal., Riverside City. Super. Ct.,
December 28,1993), in which the jury awarded the surviving spouse plaintiff S89,128,153 against the HMO
that breached its contract, acted in bad faith, and recklessly inflicted emotional distress when it denied her a
bone-marrow transplant based on the theory that such a procedure was experimental. Although the award was
appealed, no subsequent decision has been published. See Julie Gannon Shoop, Jury Holds HA1O Liablefor
Refusing Coverage, TRIAL, March 1994, at 90, 90-91. Further information about the verdict is available on
Westlaw; see 1993 WL 794305 (T.D.Cal. Jury).
111 No. 86-25767NM-2, slip op. (Mich. Cir. Ct. Apr. 27, 1989).
112 Quoted in Parise, supra note 12, at 995. See also Salmon, supra note 18, at 83.
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violation of public policy.113 The case settled, so the legal significance is limited. Still,
the court's receptiveness to the plaintiffs theory of liability is noteworthy.
The California Courts of Appeal in Wickline and Wilson reached opposite
conclusions about the liability of third-party payers. The California Supreme Court
has not yet stepped forward to offer the final word on apportionment of responsibility
between the treating physician and the payor." 4 Thus, practicing attorneys can still
invoke Wickline to avoid MCO liability or Wilson to apportion liability to an MCO
based on its role in causing the harm. However, even in light of the problems that
result from the strong economic motivation behind an MCO's reluctance to authorize
many treatments or other services, no California decision to date has offered any
formal legal test concerning assessment of the role played by cost-containment
measures in causation analysis. The law in this area is just beginning to develop and
merits close monitoring.
C. Case law Establishing Vicarious Liability on the Part of the MCO
Vicarious liability can be established under a number of different theories,
including respondeat superior, -ostensible agency, and agency by estoppel or
representation. Although direct liability of HMOs will grow in the wake of the
Wickline and Wilson decisions, some courts may still require that a claim for relief be
based on the master-servant or principal-agent relationship. It should also be noted
that comparative liability principles do not apply to an employer or principal who is
found to be vicariously liable for the conduct of an employee. In other words, the
principal is liable only for the agent's share; the principal's conduct is not compared
on the basis of independent conduct and liability." 5
In Raglin v. HMO Illinois, Inc."6 the Illinois Court of Appeals confirmed that:
HMOs are not immune from liability.... However, a lack of immunity from
prosecution for malpractice does not mean afortiorithat HMOs may be held
strictly liable for any injury that might occur to one of their medical care plan
113 Parise, supra note 12, at 995.
114 Other decisions add to the confusion. The California Court of Appeal in Pulvers v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp.
Plan, 99 Cal. App. 3d 560, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1979), rejected the plaintiffs allegations that participating

physicians were motivated by a financial incentive arrangement to limit tests and treatment. The court noted
that incentive plans are recommended by both professional organizations and the Federal HMO Act. The case
may have been brought too early in the evolution of MCO liability doctrine.
115 The practitioner is advised to consult CALIFORNIA FORMS OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE, supra note 51, at 76,

for a practical overview of litigation concerns related to vicarious liability.
116 230 Ill. App. 3d 642, 595 N.E.2d 153 (1992).
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subscribers during the course of medical treatment. Some recognized legal
theory must be the basis for holding an HMO liable for medical malpractice." 7
The Raglin court stated that such a legal theory could be predicated on vicarious
liability in two situations. First, it considered whether a master-servant relationship
existed between the parties and whether the alleged negligent activity was within the
scope of employment. However, because the physicians in Raglin were independent
contractors, the master-servant relationship was not express. The Raglin court then
considered whether an agency relationship could be created between the HLMO and
physicians. The court stated that:
this approach provided two avenues by which one may attempt to create a
fact question on the issue of the liability of HMO [Illinois]: (1) by a showing
of implied authority, i.e. that the facts and circumstances indicate that HMOI
actually exerted sufficient control over the physicians to negate the
independent contractor status, at least with respect to third parties ... or (2)
by a showing of apparent authority, i.e. that HMOI, by its actions or
statements, led a third party, who may have been unaware of the independent
contractor relationship, to believe that the physicians were controlled by
HMOI.... 118

The California Court of Appeal interpreted the vicarious liability of an indemnitee
in Herrerov. Atkinson and adopted a theory applicable to an employer-independent
contractor model." 9 The Herrero court also emphasized the necessity of a special
relationship in order to support a claim for indemnification. The Herrero court
refused to impute a special relationship based solely on status as co-defendants acting
in pari delicto and stated that it would disallow indemnification based on such a
theory. It did, however, find grounds for indemnification based on the principal-agent
theory in that case. 2° Thus, a physician seeking indemnification from an MCO must
be careful in her cross-complaint to specify the nature of the legal relationship and
corresponding obligations. The language in Herrero is very broad, but may be limited
by the factual situation, which involves a principal (in Herrero,a physician; in most
cases, an MCO) seeking recovery from agents (two other physicians who actually

117 Id. at 646, 595 N.E.2d at 155-156.
118 Id. at 647, 595 N.E.2d at 156 (citations omitted).
119 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 74, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490,493 (1964).
120 Id. at 77. 38 Cal. Rptr. at 494-495.
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administered the blood transfusion causing the patient's death). The result might be
quite different if the agents were seeking indemnification from the principal.
Consequently, this is a weak theory for recovery.
1. Respondeat Superior
The doctrine of respondeat superior is based on the premise that when an
innocent party is injured through tortious conduct committed in furtherance
of a business enterprise, the enterprise should bear the loss as a legitimate
business expense [citation omitted]. Under this doctrine, courts deliberately
place the risk of loss upon the business entity because it can better absorb the
loss and shift the cost to society as a whole."12
Respondeat superior does not apply to independent contractor relationships.
Under the staff model, where physicians are employed directly by the MCO, this
theory is useful for extending liability from physician to employer. However,
relatively few MCOs, if any, use the staff model. Although the MCO may achieve a
level of control similar to that of an employer by means such as denial of use of
facilities for a disapproved medical procedure, compliance with treatment protocols,
requirements regarding referrals, and rules for submission of claims, the theory of
respondeat superior is likely to fail in the absence of the formal legal
employer/employee relationship.12 Thus, when the MCO and the physicians do not
stand in a true employer/employee relationship, better theories exist to support a claim
of indemnification. The best of these is the theory of ostensible agency.

121 Jim M. Perdue and Stephen R. Baxley, Cutting Costs -- Cutting Care: Can Texas Managed Care Systenis
andHMOs be Liablefor theMedicalMalpracticeofPhysicians?,27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 23, 30 (1995). Although

this interpretation must be modified pursuant to principles of comparative negligence in California, the point
remains that the master who benefits from the services of the servant should not be exempted from liability
incurred by the agent when the servant is performing services for the master and is subject to the master's
control. Perdue and Baxley argue that evidence of such control exists in the master's authority to determine the
tools or appliances the servant will use in performing the work, the master's right to dictate where the work will
be performed, and the master's right to regulate working hours.
122 See: Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. App. 1987) (holding that an HMO may be
liable for the negligent acts of a physician when an employment relationship was established and rejecting the
defense that a corporation cannot practice medicine); Dunn v. Praiss, 256 N.J. Super. 180, 606 A.2d 862
(1992), cert. denied,611 A.2d 657 (N.J. 1992) (holding that an HvMO can be held liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior despite the existence of a contract between HMO and physicians because physicians had
no discretion to accept or reject patients and were subject to other forms of control by the HMO); but see, Raglin
v. I-IMG Illinois, 230 Ill. App. 3d 642, 595 N.E.2d 153 (1992) (granting summary judgment for the 1-MO in
the absence of a true master/servant relationship between the HMO and the physicians).
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2. Ostensible Agency
Ostensible agency is defined as an implied or presumptive agency, which exists
where one either intentionally or from want of ordinary care induces another to
believe that a third person is his agent, though he never in fact employed him.
Respondeat superior depends on the level of control by the principal; ostensible
agency depends instead on the perception of a third party as to the formal
relationship. 23 Strictly speaking, agency is not involved at all; ostensible agency is
based entirely on estoppel.' 24 Section 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
explains the circumstances for the ostensible agency exception to the general rule that
employers are not liable for the conduct of independent contractors. Section 429
provides:
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for another
which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are bring rendered
by the employer or by his servants is subject to liability for physical harm
caused by the negligence of the contractor in supplying such services, to the
same extent as though the employer were supplying them himself or by his
25
servants.
Ostensible agency depends on three factors. The plaintiff patient must have a
reasonable belief that the physician is an agent of the MCO; the MCO must have
committed some act or neglect generating such a belief, and the patient must
justifiably rely on the representation of the physician's authority. 26 Factors that
influence the court's willingness to impute ostensible agency include the perception
of the MCO subscriber as to the role of the physician, claims in promotional and

123 Perdue & Baxley, supra note 121, at 33.
124 See, e.g, Grewe v. Mt. Clemens Gen. Hosp., 404 Mich. 240,250-251,273 N.W.2d 429,433 (1978), which
based a finding of agency by estoppel on three factors: (1) the patient must perceive the treating physician to
be an employee or agent of the institution when she is not; (2) the institution must fail to inform the patient
otherwise; and (3) the patient must change positions based on such reliance, that is, must pay the institution or
suffer some loss.
125 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965).

126 Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 3, at 310.
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marketing materials, and the subscriber's freedom of choice in choosing his
27
physician. 1
The Pennsylvania Superior Court applied this theory to a case involving hospital
liability for the negligent conduct of its independent contractor physicians, 12 but the
same analysis could be exercised when an independent contractor physician and an
MCO are named as co-defendants or joint obligers in a medical malpractice action.
Other jurisdictions have had occasion to consider the question of liability of an MCO
under the theory of ostensible agency. In Boyd v. Albert EinsteinMedical Center,129
the plaintiff alleged that she relied on representations in the HMO's literature of "total
health care." The literature stated that the HMO "provides the physicians, hospitals
and other health care professionals needed to maintain good health." In finding that
the physician was the ostensible agent of the HMO, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 267, which provides that:
one who represents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby
causes a third person to justifiably rely upon the care or skill of such apparent
agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack of
care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were
such. 130
The court reversed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment for the HMO,
holding that there was an issue of material fact as to whether the participating
physicians were the ostensible agents of the HMO.I"' The Boyd court remanded the
case to determine the nature and extent of the reliance of the plaintiff on the HMO's
representations in order to determine if the representations were sufficient to invoke
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. While setting the stage for the creation of the

127 See: Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 377 Pa. Super. 609, 547 A.2d 1229 (1988) (finding HMO liable

under theory of ostensible agency); McClellan v. HMO ofPennsylvania,413 Pa. Super. 128,604 A.2d 1053
(1992), appeal denied 616 A.2d 985 (1992) (holding HMO liable on a theory of ostensible agency and
misrepresentation of competency of physician); Schleier v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 876 F.2d 174 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (holding that HMO's control extended to outside consultant who answered to HMO physician). But
see: Raglin, 230111. App. 3d 642, 595 N.E.2d 153 (1992) and Chase v. Indep. Practice Assn., 31 Mass. App.
Ct. 661, 583 N.E.2d 251 (1991) (denying liability under theory of ostensible agency).
128 Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 287 Pa. Super. 364,430 A.2d 647 (1980).
129 377 Pa. Super. 609, 547 A.2d 1229 (1988).

130 Id. at 620, 547 A.2d at 1234.
131 Id.at 621, 547 A.2d at 1235.
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agency, the court never established that an ostensible agency relationship existed
under the circumstances.
The California courts have not yet addressed the issue of whether vicarious
liability arises from the MCO-physician relationship on a theory of ostensible agency.
However, the California Court of Appeal considered a somewhat analogous
principal-agent relationship in Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.132 Sears hired a statelicensed independent private investigation firm to locate a potential eye witness who
had seen a Sears customer sustain an injury for which she was suing Sears. An
employee of the detective agency gained admittance to a hospital room where the
plaintiff was confined and deceptively secured the address of an eye witness to
plaintiffs injury. In reversing the trial court's dismissal of two of the causes of action,
the California Court of Appeal made statements that may be relevant to physicians
and MCOs.
First, the Noble court held that "where a corporation undertakes an activity
involving possible danger to the public under a license or franchise granted by public
authorities, these liabilities may not be evaded by delegating performance to an
'
independent contractor."133
Applied within the context of MCOs, the decision in
Noble indicates that a managed care organization may not avoid responsibility for the
results of its conduct by pointing its finger at the physician.
The Noble court used the danger policy rationale to further expand the doctrine
of vicarious liability by applying the following reasoning. The court first identified the
concept of negligent supervision in section 213 of the Restatement (Second):
A person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject to
liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless...
in the supervision of the activity;..."'
The court then proceeded to interpret this general principle in light of the public safety
rationale stated above:
Although a principal may be liable for the torts of an agent committed in the
scope of authority [citations omitted], that theory of vicarious liability is not
based on the fact that the principal is negligent if he fails to supervise the
agent. The principal is held liable as a matter of public policy, in order to

132 33 Cal. App. 3d 654, 109 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1973).
133 Id. at 660-661,109 Cal. Rptr. at 273, citing Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 17 Cal. 2d 594, 110 P.2d 1044
(1941).

134 33 Cal. App. 3d at 663-664, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
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promote safety for thirdpersons. The theory of liability is that the principal
is holding out the agent as competent and fit to be trusted, and thereby, in
effect, warranting good conduct and fidelity of the agent.135
The court stated that it found no authority for basing liability on negligent hiring "in
the absence of knowledge by the principal that the agent or servant was a person who
'
could not be trusted to act properly without being supervised."136
Although the decision in Noble certainly expands the ambit of vicarious liability
based on ostensible agency, it is probably most useful to a patient plaintiff suing codefendant physician and MCO. Its utility in a cross-complaint by a physician against
an MCO is questionable. The public safety rationale against allowing an MCO to
delegate completely and therefore evade liability certainly expands the basis for
bringing in an MCO as a co-defendant. However, no physician or carrier will be
comfortable invoking the court's requirement that the hiring principal is liable only if
it knows that the agent could not be trusted to act properly without being supervised.
The Noble decision raises another interesting issue with respect to negligent
hiring. The court refused to state that an employer has discharged his duty of care
merely because the contractor he hires is properly licensed. The Noble court stated
that "we cannot say on the record before us that, as a matter of law, this [licensure]
was sufficient to show that Sears exercised reasonable care in their choice.' ' 137 If the
California courts follow Noble, an MCO will have a difficult time arguing that the fact
that a physician is licensed by the state is sufficient evidence of professional
competence and relieves the MCO of liability for negligent hiring of a physician, or
of liability for the negligent acts of that physician.
Ostensible agency theory is not without limitations. Jan Lewis suggests a number
of factors that may defeat a claim based on ostensible agency, including: (1) the MCO
has many member physicians; (2) the physicians have authority to refer out of the plan
when necessary; (3) promotional materials emphasize the patient's right to select and
change physicians; (4) the subscriber contract and handbook have disclaimers stating
that member physicians are independent contractors; and (5) advertising makes the
independent contractor relationship clear.'38 Of these factors, the fourth and fifth
would be strong defenses against ostensible agency, but the others can be interpreted
to support ostensible agency as easily as they can be perceived to defeat it: a large
135 Id. at 663, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 275, citing Bank of Cal. v. W.U. Tel. Co., 52 Cal. 280, 288 (1877) (emphasis
added).
136 33 Cal. App. 3d at 664, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
137 Id.
138 Lewis, supra note 5, at 76.
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number of physicians is more likely to be associated with a conventional business or
corporate employment arrangement; the authority to refer out is common for high
level employees; and the patient's right to select a physician is analogous to any
consumer's right to choose the particular employee within a business with whom she
wishes to work.
D.

Statutory Authority as the Basis for a Claim

The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 39 authorizes private causes
of action for suits against private HMOs. 4° Section 300e(c)(5) of the Act requires
that HMO agreements provide "meaningful procedures for hearing and resolving
grievances between the health maintenance organization (including the medical group
or groups and other health delivery entities providing health services for the
organization) and the members of the organization." If the H2MO fails to satisfy this
requirement, a member might bring, say, a claim against the HMO if she was not
provided with a timely decision as to specific medical care (termed "time critical") and
the delay resulted in aggravating the condition. Such conduct constitutes a statutory
violation and the plaintiff can then proceed on both negligence and negligence per se
causes of action. The effect of the HMO Act on a claim for indemnification is difficult
to assess, since it appears to implicate physicians as well as HMOs themselves.
However, it may be possible for a physician to argue that she attempted in good faith
to comply with the terms of the Act, but that an HMO-created delay interfered with
her ability to deliver proper health care.
As discussed above, ERISA considerations may also affect a claim for
indemnification. ERISA only preempts claims filed by a plan participant that relate
to employee benefits. The United States Supreme Court addressed the breadth of
ERISA preemption as against third parties in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency
and Servs. Inc.41
'
The Court held that "lawsuits against ERISA plans for
run-of-the-mill state-law claims ...or even torts committed by an ERISA plan" are
not contemplated by Congress as subject to preemption.'42

139 42 U.S.C.A. § 300e (West 1991 & Supp. 1996). The Act was amended in 1976, 1978, 1981, 1986, and 1988.
140 See, e.g., Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 99 Cal. App. 3d 560, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1979). A federal

district court addressed a possible conflict between ERISA and the Health Maintenance Act in Hewlett-Packard
Company v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978), finding that "[t]he lHMO
Act regulates private health care providers but not employee benefit plans that do not directly provide health care
services." Id. at 504.
141 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
142 Id. at 833.
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Managed care organizations in California are licensed by the California
Department of Corporations. The duties of such managed care organizations are set
forth in the Knox-Keene Act.1 43
Although the Knox-Keene Act calls for
administrative remedies and does not provide for private causes of action, violations
of its provisions may support a negligence per se cause of action in establishing duty
and breach.
In 1994, the California Department of Corporations brought an administrative
accusation and petition to assess penalties against licensee Takecare Health Plan, Inc.
for failure to provide a timely referral to a qualified specialist and subsequent denial
of payment for medically necessary treatment of a young member's life-threatening
cancer.'" Although the action has limited precedential value, it does lay out statutory
and administrative law that may provide the basis for a complaint of negligence per
se. The Department of Corporations charged Takecare with violation of Health and
Safety Code section 1367(d), which states in pertinent part that every licensed health
care service plan shall furnish "ready referral of patients to other providers at such
times as may be appropriate consistent with good professional practice."' 45
Furthermore, the Department relied on Health and Safety Code section 1367(e),
which provides that "[a]ll services shall be readily available at reasonable times to all
enrollees. To the extent feasible, the plan shall make all services readily accessible to
all enrollees."'" The Department also invoked subsection (g) of the statute provides
that "[t]he plan shall be able to demonstrate to the department that medical decisions
are rendered by qualified medical providers, unhindered by fiscal and administrative
management."' 47 Finally, the Department cited Rule 1300.70(b)(1)(D), which
reaffirms that appropriate care may not be withheld or delayed for any reason,
"including a potential financial gain and/or incentive to the plan providers...

143 The Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act is fully codified at California Health and Safety Code sections
1340 through 1399.7 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996). For a good basic explanation of the origin and objectives of
the Knox-Keene Health Act, see Wayne Simon, State Regulation of liMOs: CurrentIssues, 11 WnTTIER L.
REv. 7 (1989).
144 Comm'r of Corps. of the State of Cal. v. Takecare Health Plan, Inc., No. 933-0290 (filed with the Department
of Corporations of the State of California).
145 Id. at 7.
146 Id. at 8.
147 Id. at 11.
148 Id., citing CAL. CODEREGS. tit. 10, § 1300.70(b)(1)(D) (1995).
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V. CONCLUSION
A physician who seeks equitable indemnity from a managed care organization
should be prepared to advance a viable theory for recovery, based in large part on the
doctrine that has evolved through plaintiff patient causes of action. The physician or
malpractice carrier should also have a solid understanding of the strengths and
limitations of indemnity doctrine in the context of the physician/managed care
organization context. The equitable indemnification cases make clear that the courts
traditionally attached secondary or passive liability, at best, to principals when they
have been found liable for negligent conduct involving their agents. Thus, the
physician assumed the burden of most malpractice awards and had limited, if any,
rights for indemnity from the MCO.
In today's health care structure, this one-way model is outmoded. The physician
should be prepared to contend that recent judicial decisions and legislation
acknowledge that MCOs are increasingly active participants in determining medical
care.' 49 Lawmakers have responded to this shift and as a result plaintiffs have an
increasing opportunity to assign greater direct and indirect liability to MCOs. To be
consistent with these developments, we must abandon the traditional theories of
indemnification that protected the MCO against assuming liability for the actions of
the physician. Modern equitable principles should be available to protect physicians
against shouldering full financial responsibility for damages caused by the policies of
the MCO.

149 See Prager, supra note 25, at 72, referring to a recent unpublished 1995 decision in which a plaintiff sued

physicians and an HMO for medical malpractice and unreasonable cost-containment measures, respectively.
The suit also claimed that the physicians had breached their fiduciary duty by failing to disclose their financial
incentives for withholding care. That claim was dismissed, but the plaintiff was awarded S3 million in damages
against the HMO.

